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Non-technical summary:
German unication fundamentally changed the terms for macroeconometric ana-
lysis. First, data availability poses a severe problem for econometric approaches.
Second, unication may have led to structural changes in the behavioural equa-
tions.
In this paper we use a macroeconometric disequilibrium model to handle these
problems. It is based on a microeconomic decision model of households and rms.
Thus, under the assumption that utility and prot maximization do not dier
substantially between East and West German households and rms, these be-
havioural equations seem to be capable to capture the transition process without
dramatic changes. However, as a result of unication some parameters treated
as exogeneous in the model have also changed, in particular parameters related
to scal policy decisions. To measure the impact of these eects is one reason
for the reestimation of the model for the time period 1960 to 1997, covering East
Germany from 1991 onwards.
The main focus of our contribution is the modeling of investment behaviour and
employment adjustment. The empirical estimations show that the disequilibrium
model is able to analyze the changes induced by unication.
Most behavioural relationships remained fairly stable when switching from West
Germany to unied Germany. On the other hand investment behaviour after uni-
cation was dierent from before. However, the adjustment speed diers at least
in the early years after unication. These dierences mainly have to be attributed
to the specics of investment in East Germany, where the willingness to invest
was highly driven by scal incentives.
Two preliminary policy simulations analyse the impact of the demand shock in
the West German economy in the aftermath of unication and the eects of the
nancial support by government for private investment. Both simulations depend
on the prevailing regimes on goods and labour markets. In the rst simulation
we assume that exports to eastern Germany were reduced by 25% from 1990
on. During the capacity regime before 1992, the eect of the demand shock is
much larger for goods demand than for output itself. However, to the extent
that the demand regime gains importance in the recession 1992, the gap closes.
On the labour market demand determined employment shrinks markedly, while
capacity employment does not show any eect in the beginning and decreases
only marginally from 1993 onwards. In the second simulation we assume that
the nancial incentives were halved. This reduction saves at least half of the ex-
penditures for governmental investment subsidies in East Germany. We assume
that this money is spent for governmental consumption. Our results reveal, that
while output increases during demand regime, it decreases by 0.5% in 1997 during
capacity regime. On the labour market employment also reduces by about 0.5%.
Abstract:
Unication fundamentally changed the terms of quantitative macroeconomic ana-
lysis for Germany. Two main areas concerned are data availability for the eastern
part of Germany and structural changes within the behavioural equations after
unication.
Our paper presents results from the estimation of a macroeconometric disequi-
librium model formerly developed for West Germany. The challenge is to handle
the structural break in the time series and the economic model by applying a SUR
estimator for West Germany and the Federal Republic of Germany, respectively.
The main focus here is the modeling of investment expenditures and employment
adjustment. The empirical results are encouraging and show that the disequili-
brium model is exible enough to analyze the changes induced by unication.
In particular, our results reveal that most behavioural relationships remained
fairly stable when switching from West Germany to the Federal Republic of Ger-
many. One notable exception is investment behaviour which { during the rst
years after unication { was strongly aected by scal incentives in East Ger-
many. Preliminary policy simulations show eects of these scal incentives and
the demand shock to the West German economy. The simulated responses depend
on the prevailing regimes on goods and labour markets.
Zusammenfassung:
Die deutsche Wiedervereinigung veranderte die Ausgangslage fur makrookonome-
trische Analysen. Dies betrit zum einen die Verfugbarkeit von Daten in Ost-
deutschland, zum anderen die in Folge der Wiedervereinigung bedingten struk-
turellen Veranderungen in den Verhaltensgleichungen.
Diese Studie zeigt die Schatzergebnisse eines makrookonometrischen Ungleichge-
wichtsmodells, das fur Westdeutschland entwickelt wurde. Zum einen bestand
die Herausforderung darin, eine Losung fur den Strukturbruch in den Zeitreihen
zu nden, zum anderen darin, die strukturellen Veranderungen in den Modell-
gleichungen mittels eines SUR-Ansatzes fur West- und Gesamtdeutschland abzu-
bilden. Den Schwerpunkt dieses Beitrags bildet die Modellierung der Investitio-
nen und der Beschaftigungsanpassung. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass das Ungleich-
gewichtsmodell exibel genug ist, um die Veranderungen infolge der deutschen
Wiedervereinigung zu analysieren. Die meisten Verhaltensgleichungen bleiben bei
dem

Ubergang von West- zu Gesamtdeutschland stabil. Eine Ausnahme bildet
das durch die oentlichen Fordermittel beeinusste Investitionsverhalten.
Vorlauge Simulationen untersuchen die Wirkungen des vereinigungsbedingten
Nachfrageschocks im Westen sowie der oentlichen Fordermassnahmen im Osten.
Die Simulationsergebnisse hangen von den jeweils vorherrschenden Regimen auf
dem Arbeits- und Gutermarkt ab.
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1 Introduction
The transformation of the East European economies certainly is one of the most
challenging episodes for economic policy makers. In most of these countries, we
have seen a large number of advisors coming and going. Some of them spent
useful advice while others failed to do so. Obviously, there was and still is no
unanimity about the right answers to the economic problems faced by the tran-
sition countries. One reason for misleading advice may be seen in the missing
experience with similar economic circumstances, the other in the failure to pro-
vide and use adequate models of the economic systems. Our contribution may be
seen as a pleading for macroeconomic modeling in order to capture the relevant
interactions within an economy which becomes even more crucial in a rapidly
changing environment as for the transition countries. Furthermore, in order to be
fruitful for an analysis of economic policy, such models have to be quantied, e.g.
by econometric methods.
This is the approach followed in our contribution for the case of Germany. The
case of Germany is special as the adjustment of a central planning economy to
the mainly market driven West German economy did not come gradually, but oc-
cured within a few months in 1990. On July 1, 1990, the State Treaty between the
Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic established
a monetary, economic and social union. It was a major step towards political
unication of Germany which took place on October 3, 1990. Economic unica-
tion led to a free ow of goods, labour and capital across the former border. The
transition to market economy confronted East Germany with deep-seated adjust-
ment problems (see section 2). Three determinants were important for the further
development:
{ the sharp appreciation of the East Germany currency due to an exchange
rate xed at 1 DM per East German Mark,
{ the massive transfers from West to East Germany (about 150 { 200 billions
DM per year),
{ and the relative size and productivity of the West and East German eco-
nomy.
East German output amounted to about 10 percent, employment to about 20
percent of West German gures. This corresponds to a 50 percent lower labour
productivity in East Germany.
Obviously, macroeconomic modeling is more demanding in such a context,
in particular when quantitative estimates are required. The problems can be
summarized under two separate headings. First, data availability poses a severe
problem for econometric approaches. Second, German unication may have lead
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to structural changes in the behavioural equations. This setting requires specic
estimation techniques. Let us now turn to these aspects in some more detail.
Data availability is a problem for East Germany prior to unication, because
ocial statistics are based on a fundamentally dierent accounting system. Thus,
these data cannot be compared with national account data for West Germany
or Germany after unication. Furthermore, the introduction of the West Ger-
man national accounting system to East Germany took some time. Therefore,
observations for 1990 and 1991 are subject to a larger degree of uncertainty than
during the period afterwards. Further diculties arise because detailed national
accounting for West Germany lasted only until 1994. Only a few key gures for
West Germany from the Federal Statistics Oce are available until the recent
past. Therefore, we have to work with West German data for the time period
1960 to 1994, and with data for the unied Germany from 1991 to 1997. The
whole model was estimated with quarterly data.
The macroeconometric disequilibrium model used for the analysis is based on
a microeconomic decision model of households and rms, which is introduced in
section 3. Thus, under the assumption that utility and prot maximization do not
dier substantially between East and West German households and rms, these
behavioural equations should be capable to capture the transition process without
dramatic changes. However, as a result of unication some parameters treated as
exogeneous in the model may have also changed, in particular parameters related
to scal and monetary policy decisions or the activities of the privatisation agency
\Treuhandanstalt". To measure the impact of these eects is one of the goals of
the reestimation of the model for the time period 1960 to 1997, covering East
Germany from 1991 onwards.
In order to exploit as much information as possible from the available data,
a two equation system is estimated for most econometric equations of the model.
The rst equation covers the West German sample 1960{1994, while the sec-
ond employs the German data 1991{1997. Then, structural stability is tested
by imposing cross equation restrictions. Due to the limited number of available
observations for Germany, however, this testing is still limited to subsets of the
parameters.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the development of the macroe-
conomic situation in West and East Germany and the impact of unication is dis-
cussed. Section 3 introduces the theoretical approach of the macroeconomic dise-
quilibrium framework which is the basis of the econometric model. The structure
of the model and the modeling of German unication within the macroeconome-
tric model is the topic of section 4 which also provides some estimation results.
The performance of the model for policy analysis is demonstrated by two policy
simulations in section 5. Section 6 summarizes the main ndings and provides an
outlook to ongoing research.
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2 German Unication: Some Stylized Facts
Unication hit the West German economy in a prosperous period. After the se-
cond oil price shock in 1979/1980, the economic situation had slowly recovered,
and in 1988/89, annual economic growth amounted to about 4 percent. Employ-
ment had increased steadily since 1984 with an annual growth rate of about 1
percent in 1988/89. Industrial capacity utilization had achieved a level as high
as in the early seventies, and private investment increased steadily. Growth per-
spectives were generally good; for instance, the business survey of the ifo institute
reported that more rms expected an improvement of their business situation than
expected a worsening since 1988. Unication further enhanced optimism, and the
public opinion was that the opening of the Wall would initiate a catching-up pro-
cess in East Germany corresponding to West German post-war reconstruction.
The historical development was dierent. It soon became apparent that uni-
cation would impose severe costs especially in East Germany. The terms of
the monetary union, especially the exchange rates for labour incomes, debts and
property, implied a sharp appreciation of the East German currency. Unit labour
costs and prices increased and deteriorated the competitiveness of East German
products. Demand broke down rapidly, and in 1991, GDP was quite below the
pre-unication level. Employment adjusted only slowly which implied a further
increase of unit labour costs. To exemplify this development with two gures: In
1990, output broke down by about 40 percent, and until 1992, about one third of
the former jobs in East Germany were lost (see gure 1, left panels).
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East German demand was stabilized mainly through public transfers from
West Germany. First, public investment increased e.g. through the building of
the streets which should integrate the eastern part of Germany into the transport
system. Second, private consumption and private housing investment were stabi-
lized through rather generous unemployment benets, increasing real retirement
benets, high incomes of public employees and increasing real values of monetary
assets. Note the favourable currency conversion rate for income and monetary
assets. Third, private investment was heavily subsidized, both for enterprises and
for private housing.
In the sequel, massive dismissals increased the utilization of employment and
reduced unit labour costs. The high investment further contributed to the increase
of labour productivity by capital deepening and technology transfers, and since
1993, East Germany is on a steady but painfully slow process of adjustment with
respect to the West. Remarkable are especially the extraordinary high investment
rates. The share of investment in output amounts to about 40 percent, and invest-
ment per employee is well above the West German level (see the bottom panels in
1
The data for 1989 are national accounts estimates of the DIW, Berlin.
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Figure 1: Output, employment and investment
annual rates in %
annual rates in %
Index, 1989=1 Index, 1989=1
1000 DM
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gure 1).
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In the following years, output slowly recovered, but employment hardly
increased until 1999. Unemployment gures remained above 1 million since 1991
which corresponds to unemployment rates of nearly 20 percent.
Unication also dominated the economic development in West Germany in
the nineties. In 1990/1991, West Germany experienced a remarkable unication
boom with annual economic growth of about 6 percent (see gure 1, right pan-
els); corresponding growth rates were formerly achieved only in the late sixties.
In addition, West German employment increased by nearly 2 millions (about 3
percent per year) from late 1989 until 1991. A corresponding increase of jobs was
formerly achieved only in the fties during post-war reconstruction.
The most remarkable single aspect of the unication boom in West Germany
was the increase of demand from East Germany since 1990. This demand increase
{ i.e. West German \exports" towards East Germany { was nanced largely by
public transfers and amounted to about 150-200 billions DM per year (about 6-8
percent of GDP) in the early years after unication. Since the West German
economy was in a prosperous phase already in 1989, the demand increase led to
a further increase of private investment.
However, the West German unication boom was sharply terminated by a deep
recession 1992 with output reductions until 1993. First, the nancing of the costs
of unication increased interest rates as well as the tax burden and led to a slower
increase of private spending later on. Second, exports towards the \rest of the
world" had become smaller since 1990. Third, the unication boom had increased
capacities, therefore the slowdown of demand reduced capacity utilization and led
to a reduction of investment. The massive reduction of investment contributed to
the slowdown of demand. The rather low growth rates of output of about 2 percent
since 1994 were to small to stop the reduction of employment, and in 1997, the
whole unication increase of employment was lost. Employment declined by 1.5
millions and unemployment increased to more than 3 millions until 1998. Together
with the still high unemployment in East Germany, the total unemployment gure
is above 4 millions in the most recent past, corresponding to an unemployment
rate of about 12 percent.
In the following gures, some key aspects of the productivity development of
East Germany relative to West Germany are reported. Figure 2 depicts the ratios
of East vs. West Germany.
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The upper left panel shows the development of relative
labour productivity per employee. Labour productivity in the former GDR (1989)
was much lower than the respective gure for West Germany. It amounts to less
than 40 percent of the West level, corresponding to about the West German level
2
The gures refer to construction (excluding housing) and equipment investment of rms,
i.e. they exclude inventories, private housing and the public sector.
3
In gure 6 in the appendix, the corresponding data for West and East Germany, respectively,
are depicted.
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in 1960. The breakdown of production after unication further worsened the situ-
ation, but since 1991 a steady adjustment path with respect to the West German
level began (unconditional convergence). However, the adjustment process was
painfully slow: It took two years (1991/1992), before the pre-unication produc-
tivity level was re-established, and since 1993, the progress was small. Remember
also that this process was accompanied by massive employment reductions, and
real East German output today is still hardly above the pre-unication level of
1989 (see gure 1).
Two main aspects can account for this development. First, the loss of com-
petitiveness reduced demand and capacity utilization (see the upper right panels
of gures 2 and 6).
4
Since employment adjusted only slowly, labour productivity
decreased. The increase of labour productivity 1991/1992 is related to output
increases but also to the massive dismissals in this period (convergence of the
business cycle situation).
5
Second, prior to unication, the East German capi-
tal intensity of production was well below the West German level.
6
The massive
investment since late 1990 increased the capital intensity and contributed to the
adjustment of labour productivity (neoclassical convergence through adjustment
of the capital/labour ratio).
On the base of these data, the development of total factor productivity was
calculated.
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The gures reveal that East German total factor productivity (1989)
was also well below the West German level, but increased since 1991. However,
the adjustment with respect to the West level between 1991 and 1995 was only
about one percentage point per year, on average. In addition, the process of total
factor productivity convergence stopped in 1996. On the base of these trends, one
cannot be very optimistic about the future development of income and wealth in
East Germany.
Finally, the bottom panels in gures 2 and 6 depict the development of real
wages and real unit labour costs (real wages relative to real labour productivity) in
East and West Germany. It can be seen that prior to unication, real wages in East
Germany were below 40 percent of the West German level and increased to about
60 percent until today. This development, together with the corresponding deve-
lopment of labour productivity, implies real unit labour costs well above the West
German level not only in the early nineties but still in 1998. Again, these gures
4
Capacity utilization is an estimate from the econometric model. The estimate is based on
the data of the business survey of the ifo Institute, Munchen.
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See gure 1 above.
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The capital stock data for East Germany 1989 are based on the rather conservative estimate
of the Federal Statistics Oce.
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Total factor productivity tfp is calculated from ln tfp= ln(Y=L)     ln(K=L)     lnQ.
Y=L is labour productivity, K=L is the capital/labour ratio and Q is capacity utilization. The
production elasticity of physical capital  is chosen as 0.3,  is an estimate of the econometric
model.
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Figure 2: Adjustment: East to west
7
do not enhance the optimism about the future development of the employment
situation in East Germany.
3 Theoretical Model
The economic eects of German unication described in the previous section are
analyzed in a macroeconometric disequilibriummodel in section 4. The theoretical
framework of the empirical model is provided in this section.
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The macroeconomic
disequilibrium model is built on a microeconomic model of rm behaviour. In
the sequel, an aggregation procedure is discussed to derive implications for the
macroeconomic relations.
In the microeconomic model, it is assumed that rms adjust capacities and
the production technology only with a delay with respect to demand and cost
changes, thus under uncertainty about demand. Output, prices and employment
are determined in the short run with predetermined capacities and production
technology. Firm level demand YD
i
is determined by the price p
i
, exogenous
demand shifts Z
i
and a demand shock "
i
which is not known at the time of the
investment decision. For simplicity, a log-linear demand curve is assumed
lnYD
i
= 
i
 ln p
i
+ lnZ
i
+ "
i
: (1)
implies a framework of imperfect competition on the product market. Supply
YS
i
is determined by a short-run limitational production function with capital K
i
and labour L
i
as inputs,
YS
i
= min(YC
i
; YL
i
) = min(
k
i
K
i
; 
l
i
 L
i
): (2)
YC
i
are capacities, YL
i
is the employment constraint and 
l
i
= 
l
(k
i
; 
i
) and 
k
i
=

k
(k
i
; 
i
) are the productivities of labour and capital. The factor productivities
are determined by the capital-labour ratio k
i
and production eciency 
i
. The
factor prices are assumed to be exogenous at the rm level. These assumptions
imply constant marginal costs within the capacity limit. Figure 3 provides a
visual impression of the model. For the short-run adjustment, two cases can be
distinguished:
1. In recession periods with sucient capacities (negative demand shocks, "
1
<
"
i
), the optimal price p(w
i
) is determined by unit labour costs w
i
=
l
i
and
the price elasticity of demand 
i
. Output results from introducing this price
into the demand function, and employment is the labour input required to
produce this output. The rm suers from underutilization of capacities.
8
For a more detailed discussion of the model, see Smolny (1998a,b,1999).
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Figure 3: Price and quantity adjustment
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2. In boom periods with capacity shortages (positive demand shocks, "
2
> "
i
),
output is determined by the capacity constraint YC
i
. Employment is again
given as the corresponding labour requirement, and the optimal price is
determined by the ratio of the demand level and capacities. Insucient
capacities restrain output and employment, and the rm increases the price.
The most important characteristics of the short-run model are the minimum price
p(w
i
) and the capacity limit YC
i
. The supply curve of the rm is horizontal within
the borders of capacity and vertical at the capacity limit. This provides a rst
hint towards the macroeconomic adjustment. The adjustment with respect to
demand changes depends on the availability of capacities, i.e. aggregate capacity
utilization:
{ Firms with sucient capacities adjust output and employment, the price
remains unchanged. This corresponds to the Keynesian multiplier model
which is relevant in recession periods.
{ Firms with capacity constraints adjust the price, and output and employ-
ment remain unchanged. This corresponds to the classical model which is
relevant in boom periods.
Finally, the implied price setting corresponds to a kind of Phillips-curve model
for the aggregate adjustment: Prices are determined by unit labour costs and
capacity utilization. Note also the implied asymmetry of the price and quantity
9
adjustment. For demand increases, the adjustment of output and employment is
bounded by capacities, and the price rises instead. For demand reductions, the
price adjustment is bounded by marginal costs and the price elasticity of demand,
and output and employment are reduced instead.
9
A similar asymmetry results
for cost changes.
In the long run, the rm decides on capacities and the production technology.
For the investment decision, the following properties can be derived:
{ Expected demand shifts Z
i
aect the capital stock, expected output and
expected employment proportionally; investment can be understood as an
adjustment of the capital stock with respect to demand. This implies an
accelerator mechanism for aggregate investment which introduces a source
of instability into the aggregate adjustment.
{ Higher costs increase prices proportionally and reduce optimal capacities.
The average price is determined as mark-up over labour and capital costs;
it is not aected by the level of demand. The mark-up is determined by
competition 
i
and uncertainty var("
i
).
{ The probability of (short-run) capacity constraints is determined by relative
capital costs, uncertainty and competition, i.e. not by expected demand
shifts.
{ Capital-labour substitution is determined by relative factor costs, but un-
certainty favours the exible factor, i.e. employment.
This yields another hint towards the macroeconomic adjustment. The long-run
supply curve is horizontal, average prices are determined by production costs, and
demand shifts increase all quantities proportionally.
For estimation purposes, the microeconomic minimum condition of supply and
demand of the rms can be explicitly translated into a macroeconomic relation
between the aggregates. Aggregate output Y can accurately be approximated by
a CES-type function in terms of aggregate capacities YC and aggregate demand
YD,
Y

 YD

+ YC

;  < 0: (3)
 can be interpreted as a mismatch parameter (mismatch between demand and
capacities). The aggregate multipliers, i.e. the elasticities of aggregate output
with respect to capacities and demand can be calculated from eq. (3) as
@Y
@YD

YD
Y
=

YD
Y


= prob(YD
i
< YC
i
) (4)
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In case of a delayed adjustment of prices and employment also, rationing of demand (delivery
lags) or underutilization of employment (labour hoarding) occur.
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@Y
@YC

YC
Y
=

YC
Y


= prob(YD
i
> YC
i
) (5)
These elasticities correspond to the regime probabilites, i.e. the shares of rms
within the respective regime. The aggregate model implies that the demand and
cost multipliers depend on the business cycle. In recession periods with a large
share of rms with sucient capacities, quantities (output and employment) ad-
just with respect to demand and cost changes, and prices adjust only with respect
to costs. In boom situations with a high capacity utilization and a large share of
rms with capacity constraints, prices adjust with respect to demand with only
small output and employment eects and only small eects from cost changes.
The share of rms exhibiting capacity constraints is determined by aggregate ca-
pacity utilization. If aggregate demand depends on employment, the model yields
the usual Keynesian multiplier but only within the borders of capacities, i.e. the
model exhibits both classical and Keynesian features.
The model can be extended by introducing labour supply constraints. The
availability of sucient workers can limit the adjustment of employment at the
micro level, corresponding to capacity constraints. In this case, aggregate employ-
ment L depends on aggregate labour supply LS as well,
L

 LD

+ LS

; (6)
LD

 (YD=
l
)

+ (YC=
l
)

: (7)
The adjustment of employment can be interpreted in terms of a matching model;
it depends on expected demand, capacity utilization and the unemployment rate.
The assumption of a delayed adjustment of capacities and capital-labour sub-
stitution extends the standard model by introducing demand uncertainty and
permits to analyse the resulting ineciencies. Ex ante, the rms choose capaci-
ties and the production technology under uncertainty about demand. Ex post,
dierent regimes on the goods market and underutilization of capacities are possi-
ble. The short-run demand multiplier depends on the share of rms with capacity
constraints, or aggregate capacity utilization. In the long run, rms with capacity
constraints adjust capacities. The model can be understood as an error correction
model for investment: Capacities adjust, if capacity utilization diers from the
optimum. With higher capacities, output and employment increase further, while
capacity utilization and prices should decrease. That means, demand shocks ex-
hibit an eect on prices, capacity utilization and regime proportions only in the
short run.
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4 Empirical Assessment
4.1 Structure of the Model
The macroeconomic model introduced in the previous section can be matched with
aggregate data in terms of a macroeconometric disequilibrium model, the so-called
Konstanz Mannheim Disequilibrium Model. It is a medium-sized macroeconome-
tric model which was developed to classify unemployment in dierent states of
rationing on an empirical basis. Previous versions were constructed for the West
German economy including goods and labor market as the main building blocks.
In this sense it is primarily developed to analyse the real activities of a medium
size open economy.
The model determines regime shares and corresponding levels of employment
for each point in time. Regime shares are dened as the shares of rms facing
capacity, demand and labor supply constraints. The model's most notable feature
is the capability to allow for dierent rationing constellations at the same time on
the aggregate level.
Almost all equations are estimated in an error-correction specication, which
mirrors short-term deviations from long-term relationships. The time horizon
of simulations with this model ranges between three to ten years to cover both
short-run dynamics and the tendency towards the long-run solution.
Applications to the West German economy are documented e.g. in Entorf,
Franz, Konig and Smolny (1990), Smolny (1993) and Franz, Goggelmann and
Winker (1998). The latter paper extends the estimation period to 1994 requiring
the analysis of structural breaks within the West German model. The current
attempt to incorporate the East German economy is more demanding. Thus, it is
not yet possible to present the complete macroeconometric model in this paper.
Instead, we concentrate on two central aspects, namely employment adjustment
and investment. First, we have to deal with some statistical problems.
4.2 Modeling German Unication
The most important problem of modeling German unication is the structural
break in most time series. As an example, the GDP for the Federal Republic
of Germany rose by about 50 billion DM by unication, which meant a growth
rate of 7.9% at one point of time. On the labour market labour supply increased
from 27 million to 33 million in a single step. Moreover, employment suddenly
increased about 30% and remained above the former level. Another problem is
the timespan of data available for unied Germany. Since unication occurred
in October 1990, we have only about 30 observations so far; for some series, the
West German data last only until 1994.
Our rst approach of modeling time series changing dramatically was merging
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the data for West Germany and unied Germany from the rst quarter of 1993
onwards. As mentioned above, it is quite dicult to model the transition process
in East Germany, particularly within the rst years. We had to assume that
economic adjustment had made considerable progress. An error correction form
was chosen to model the dynamic adjustment processes. We estimated the whole
model and our approach seemed to be successful at rst glance. In order to handle
the structural change in 1993.1 we used two kinds of dummies: shift dummies were
chosen for the jump on a higher level; a single dummy was taken for the period
1993.1 to consider the bias in the growth rates. International transactions dier
from this and were merged earlier. Although the results seemed to be promising,
there were some critical problems:
{ The West German and German Systems of National Accounts were mixed
together at two dierent points of time. This implied an estimation bias.
{ The dynamics of the adjustment process were not modeled correctly.
{ The estimates were not robust and highly depended on the chosen dummies.
In order to avoid these shortcomings, we chose, as an alternative, Zellner's (1962)
Seemingly Unrelated Regressor (SUR). SUR estimates are obtained by estimat-
ing a set of linear equations by imposing cross-equation constraints. In the SUR
method, the residual covariance matrix has a particular structure. Only the dis-
turbance terms of each equation are correlated with each other. A gain in eciency
occurs because in estimating the coecients of a single equation, the SUR proce-
dure takes account of zero restrictions on coecients occurring in other equations.
The idea for solving our problem is to estimate two equations simultaneously by
SUR: One equation for West Germany, the other equation for unied Germany.
In the rst step, a robust single equation for West German data is developed.
In a second step, we assume to have a similar behaviour of the agents in unied
Germany. Therefore we use the same specication by imposing the cross equa-
tion restrictions, except for the constant. This two-equation-system is estimated
simultaneously by applying Aitken's estimator. In order to extract a maximum
of information from the available data, the West German data covering the time
span from 1960 to 1994 and the data for unied Germany from 1991 to 1997 are
employed. The benets of this method are obvious:
{ We operate with two consistent Systems of National Accounts.
{ The eciency of the estimator is increased and a maximum of information
from the available data is exploited.
{ Dynamics can be modeled correctly, because articial growth rates are
avoided.
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{ The estimates depend less on the chosen dummies. In most cases dummies
can be avoided.
The imposed coecient restrictions can be tested using Wald tests and other
model specication tests. However, due to the limited number of available ob-
servations for unied Germany, only restrictions on subsets of the parameters are
tested in the current version.
The theoretical model suggests to use error correction approaches for the esti-
mation of the empirical model. The estimation procedure involves the following
steps. First, the time series properties of the data are tested by means of unit
root tests. Second, an error correction model was estimated for the West German
data in one step with the methods of ordinary least squares. This model serves as
a starting point for the two-equation-system. The two-equation-system for West
Germany and unied Germany is estimated by SUR imposing the cross equation
restriction with the West German equation. These restrictions are tested step by
step for subsets of the parameters, i.e. dynamics and the long{run solution.
4.3 Estimation Results
Investment
The conditions of the economic and monetary union and the consequences for
demand, output and employment in East Germany were already discussed in sec-
tion 2. Under these severe circumstances, East German rms had to strive for
survival. New jobs could be generated only by new investments. Given the -
nancial conditions of most East German rms, the implied wage push and the
breakdown of demand for East German products, governmental reactions seemed
necessary. The German government reacted by providing large sums of nancial
means to rebuild the industrial base in East Germany and to foster long-term
growth and employment. Governmental policy preferred to concentrate nancial
support on the factor capital. It rejected the alternative strategy of subsidizing
labour because of the danger of conserving uncompetitive labour-intensive pro-
duction structures. Furthermore, employment subsidies could have encouraged
trade unions to enhance their wage claims.
The most important instruments of governmental support were investment
bonuses (Investitionszulagen), investment grants for the improvement of regional
economic structures (Gemeinschaftsaufgabe \Verbesserung der Wirtschaftsstruk-
tur"), extra depreciation allowances (Sonderabschreibungen) and subsidized loans.
While investment bonuses were available only for new equipment, investment
grants were also given for buildings. The investment bonus was not subject to
taxation, but the investment grant was. Besides the normal depreciation practice
- which is limited by 30 percent in a degressive scheme on equipment and much
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smaller in a linear scheme on buildings - rms in East Germany had access to
an extra depreciation allowance of up to 50 percent in the rst year, combined
with a complete linear depreciation in the rst ve years. German government
banking institutions launched several credit programs to support smaller rms
in East Germany by granting them loans at reduced interest rates. Conditions
varied widely over these programs. From mid 1990 to mid 1998 rms received
investment bonus and grants in the amount of 69 billion DM. Financial support
for equity capital and the establishment of rms totaled about 22 billion DM.
Granting favourable loans and other programs to get outside capital amounted to
about 66 billion DM
10
.
Moreover, an oce to privatize the former state-owned companies, the \Treu-
handanstalt" (THA), was founded by the government. The THA had to nd
potential purchasers for transfers of rms into private ownership, to oblige them
to create new jobs, to invest a specic volume, and to control keeping the contracts.
In order to keep the location of the rms, it was very interested to nd as much
buyers as possible and therefore was willing to grant generous nancial means to
the contractual partners. Many economic agents were motivated to buy state-
owned companies to receive these nancial means which were mainly invested in
eastern Germany but often used for other purposes also.
All these public incentives for private investment have to be considered in
the empirical specication of the investment equation. Therefore, we construct a
single variable sub which is calculated as a rate by dividing the total investment
grants given for East Germany through the private investment volume. Since
data were only available on an annual basis, the values of sub are on a constant
level each quarter within a year. Moreover, we have to nd a solution for the
capital stock problem. Capital stock data for East Germany are subject to a
large degree of uncertainty in the early years after unication, since the collapse
of manufacturing in East Germany made a large fraction of the existing capital
stock obsolete. In order to take this eect into account, we follow the approach
of the Federal Statistics Oce which aims at providing a rather conservative esti-
mate of available capacities: For example, equipment which went out of use before
the end of 1992 due to the changing economic conditions was given a value of zero
already in 1991. Further reductions were made for shut-downs in the period 1993
to 1995. Finally, remaining old equipment was valued at 60% of the GDR book
value with an assumed exchange rate of 0.75 DM for one East German mark.
Despite of the resulting large write-os, real capital stock of East Germany did
not decrease in absolute terms due to the unprecedented high rates of investment
in the post unication period, which was induced by the public investment pro-
grams and generous tax relief. Data on the capital stock of unied Germany are
available from 1991 on an annual basis. Using the perpetual inventory method
10
Kiel Institute of World Economics (1999), p. 29.
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proposed by the Federal Statistics Oce, we obtain quarterly data and a total of
28 observations.
The empirical implementation of the investment function from the theoretical
model (see section 3) is also an error correction specication. The error correc-
tion term denes the long-run relationship between capital stock, real economic
activity, the relevant prices and governmental support programs.
In order to assess the robustness of our investment specication for West Ger-
many and unied Germany, estimation was performed for dierent samples. The
results are summarized in table 1. The rst two columns provide the results of sin-
gle equation estimation for West Germany covering the period 1960/1 to 1989/4,
i.e. prior to unication, in column (1), and the period 1960/1 to 1994/4 in col-
umn (2). The last two columns report the results of the SUR estimation for West
Germany 1960/1 to 1994/4 in column (3) and for unied Germany from 1991/1
to 1997/4 in column (4).
The dependent variable is the growth rate of the capital stock (equipment
and construction excluding housing)  lnK. Besides the autoregressive dynamic
structure, investment is determined by an error correction term of the capital
stock, expected production activity (E(ln y
a
))
11
and the real user costs of capital
(uc). User costs are dened as the rate of depreciation plus the real interest rate
multiplied with relative prices for investment goods. The specication for unied
Germany also considers the variable sub, which includes the governmental support
for private investment.
For the period prior to unication, the estimation results for West Germany
in column (1) are consistent with the theoretical model. Investment follows a
marked autoregressive process up to ve lags. The long{run relationship indicates
an elasticity of the capital stock with regard to expected production activity of
almost one and a negative impact of the user costs of capital. However, the
adjustment of the capital stock towards this long{run relationship is rather small
(0.5% per quarter). The choice of lag t 6 for modeling expectations about future
output is based on a procedure selecting the optimal lag length resulting in the
smallest standard error of estimation
12
.
Including West German data for the post unication period up to 1994 in
column (2) does not change the results substantially. Solely, the eect of user costs
does not show up signicantly. This nding is conrmed by the system estimates
provided in columns (3) and (4). Again, the estimates for West Germany are
almost identical to those obtained in column (2).
Wald tests were chosen to examine restrictions on the dynamics in a rst step
11
E(ln y
a
) is the expected minimum of those constraints which may prevent rms from full
utilization of capacities.
12
The procedure is described and motivated in more detail in Smolny (1993) and Franz,
Goggelmann and Winker (1998).
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Table 1: Error Correction Models for Equipment and Construction
a
Dependent variable:  lnK
t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
West West West Unied
Germany Germany Germany Germany
c 0:020
(4.42)
0:014
(4.48)
0:015
(5.00)
0:137
(5.68)
 lnK
t 1
0:764
(9.61)
0:823
(11.46)
0:844
(15.30)
0:252
(3.14)
 lnK
t 2
0:094
(1.06)
0:112
(1.32)
0:034
(0.58)
0:254
(3.13)
 lnK
t 4
0:461
(5.25)
0:483
(5.69)
0:608
(9.33)
 0:109
(-1.43)
 lnK
t 5
 0:547
(-7.10)
 0:588
(-8.23)
 0:670
(-12.10)
0:044
(-0.61)
lnK
t 1
 0:005
(-3.17)
 0:005
(-3.04)
 0:005
(-3.95)
 0:037
(-10.85)
E
t 6
(ln y
a
t
) 0:004
(2.06)
0:004
(2.28)
0:005
(3.13)
0:029
(10.20)
uc
t 1
 0:006
(-1.56)
 0:001
(-0.25)
 0:0001
(-0.06)
 0:0001
(-0.06)
sub
t 1
{ { { 0:022
(5.18)

R
2
0.983 0.982 0.982 0.992
SEE  1000 0.535 0.545 0.551 0.165
Sample 61:3-89:4 61:3-94:4 61:3-94:4 92:3-97:4
t{values in parentheses
a
construction excluding housing
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and restrictions on the long-run coecients in a second step.
13
All coecient
restrictions for unied Germany had to be clearly rejected.
14
This is in contrast
to most other equations of the macroeconometric model highlighting the partic-
ularity of investment in East Germany. The signicant higher constant in the
investment equation for unied Germany is attributed to the enormous volume
of governmental support for private investment (right of way for private investors
etc.). Return on investment before taxes was extraordinarily high, rms were
highly motivated and investments were realized within impressively short time.
Therefore, the dynamic part of the investment process was less dierent. The
long{run relationship is highly signicant implying an elasticity of the optimum
capital stock with regard to expected production activity somewhat smaller than
for West Germany. First period adjustment towards this long{run relationship is
much higher than for West Germany (3.7% versus 0.5%). The variable mirroring
scal incentives, sub, is also highly signicant and clearly shows the impact of
generous governmental support on investment in East Germany. This eect is the
base of our policy simulation in section 5 where we analysed the eect of nancial
support by halving its volume.
To sum up, investment behaviour after unication was dierent from before.
Since the changes are small for West German investment, the dierences mainly
have to be attributed to the specics of investment in East Germany. Besides
the arguments already listed above, the replacement of the old capital stock by
modern technology in an extraordinary short period of time contributed to these
dierences. The willingness to invest was highly driven by governmental incen-
tives.
Employment
Let us now turn to the employment eects of unication. As discussed in sec-
tion 2, the breakdown of demand for East German products was accompanied
by a shift towards West Germany. The eects of the resulting enormous demand
increase in West Germany are mirrored in our macroeconometric model.
15
Here,
a few central estimation results are reported. Figure 4 provides estimates of the
employment series. Besides employment L and labour supply LS, capacity employ-
ment L(YC) and demand determined employment L(YD) are depicted as derived
in equations (6) and (7) in the theoretical model. L(YC) describes the capacity
constraints for employment, while L(YD) gives the employment level necessary to
produce goods demand.
The left hand plot shows rstly the tremendous increase in labour supply in
13
Since the user costs were insignicant, we did not consider this variable in the Wald test.
14
see table 3.
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A simulation of these eects is undertaken in section 5.
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Figure 4: Employment series
Mio Mio
West Germany LS during the 1980s. It continued after unication up to 1992.
A part of this further increase of almost 2 million people can be attributed to
intra-national labour mobility. Although increasing prior to unication, demand
determined employment L(YD) in West Germany received a major boost by the
enormous demand increase from East Germany. In the peak period 1991, it almost
exceeded labour supply. By contrast, capacity employment L(YC) falls short of
labour supply by more than 1.5 million. Although growing faster than labour
supply from the mid 80s, capacities in West Germany failed to catch up with
labour supply and increased goods demand in the aftermath of unication. Hence,
existing capacities have become the major limiting factor to employment in West
Germany.
The recession in 1992/93 is marked by a sharp decrease of demand determined
employment, which led to less investment and nally strengthened the restrictions
imposed by capacities. Data availability does not allow to extend the estimation
of L(YD) beyond 1994. Therefore, the analysis continues with the right hand plot
of the gure showing estimates for unied Germany.
Labour supply in Germany LS remained fairly stable from 1989 onwards. How-
ever, this corresponds to an increase of the labour supply in West Germany by
about 2 million and a similar decrease in East Germany. Furthermore, capacity
employment L(YC) shrinks in Germany mirroring both a slight decrease for West
Germany and the economic depreciation of the East German capital stock.
Demand side eects were almost irrelevant in West Germany during the early
19
years of unication when repressed consumption could nally be realized out of
savings and transfers. As capacities were still growing when this unication shock
settled down, the resulting lack of demand contributed signicantly to the bad
labour market performance in the 1992/93 recession. However, this temporary
intertemporal shift of demand seems to loose importance for the labour market
performance in the late 1990s. Now, again the capacity constraint dominates
employment.
The next step of modeling the labour market consists in linking the estimates
for demand determined employment, capacity employment and labour supply with
actual employment by the aggregate labour market function. This provides an
estimate of the mismatch on the labour market. The mismatch parameter for the
labour market is modeled by a deterministic time trend both for West Germany
and unied Germany. The estimates indicate an increasing mismatch from 1960
onwards and a slightly higher degree of mismatch for unied Germany. The
dierence, however, is not signicant.
The long-run relation between labour supply, capacity employment and de-
mand determined employment is estimated by a static CES function derived from
the theoretical model.
16
This static relationship does not dier signicantly be-
tween West Germany and Germany after unication. However, the dynamic ad-
justment of employment towards this static relationship may dier. Dynamic
adjustment is modeled in an error correction framework. Unfortunately, the lim-
ited number of observations for unied Germany (1992{1997) does not yet permit
the serious estimation of this approach. Nevertheless, it is possible to analyse
adjustment in West Germany prior and after unication, respectively. Dynamic
behaviour on the labour market is modeled in a further error correction model,
where L is the endogenous variable. The value of the exogenous variable L

was
tted in the above mentioned static CES function. Results of our error correction
model are summarized in Table 2 below. The estimates for West Germany for
the two samples 1960{1988 and 1960{1994 indicate a slightly higher persistence
of short term changes when the post unication period is included. However,
at the same time the error correction term becomes smaller resulting in a lower
overall adjustment. The system estimates are provided in columns (3) and (4)
again. Since the dynamic part of employment was quite similar, coecients were
restricted. In the long term of the error correction model adjustment parameter
did not dier signicantly.
17
16
see equation(6) and equation(7).
17
see table 3.
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Table 2: Error Correction Models for Employment
Dependent variable:  lnL
t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
West West West Unied
Germany Germany Germany Germany
c 0:083
(2.60)
0:059
(2.55)
0:065
(3.19)
0:069
(3.14)
 lnL
t 1
0:257
(3.03)
0:258
(3.23)
0:244
(3.62)
0:244
(3.62)
 lnL
t 4
0:590
(9.27)
0:611
(10.40)
0:562
(10.75)
0:562
(10.75)
 lnL
t 5
 0:380
(-6.00)
 0:335
(-5.66)
 0:287
(-5.85)
 0:287
(-5.85)
 lnL

t
0:275
(9.10)
0:298
(10.23)
0:306
(11.41)
0:306
(11.41)
 lnL

t 1
0:030
(0.64)
0:032
(0.74)
0:009
(0.23)
0:009
(0.23)
 lnL

t 2
 0:072
(-1.83)
 0:050
(-1.40)
 0:043
(-1.44)
 0:043
(-1.44)
 lnL

t 4
 0:081
(-2.11)
 0:082
(-2.15)
 0:088
(-2.52)
 0:088
(-2.52)
lnL
t 1
 0:168
(-3.63)
 0:139
(-3.66)
 0:154
(-4.63)
 0:154
(-4.63)
lnL

t 1
0:142
(3.49)
0:122
(3.44)
0:133
(4.34)
0:133
(4.34)

R
2
0.945 0.938 0.938 0.910
SEE  1000 0.251 0.254 0.258 0.264
Sample 61:3-88:4 61:3-94:4 61:3-94:4 90:3-97:4
t{values in parentheses
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5 Policy Simulations
Two policy simulations are carried out in order to assess the empirical content of
our macroeconometric disequilibrium model in the context of German unication.
The rst simulation analyses the impact of the demand shock on the West German
economy in the aftermath of unication. The second simulation is concerned
with the eects of the generous nancial support by the government for private
investment in East Germany. Some key results of both simulations are reported
in gure 5 (left panels for the rst and right panels for the second simulation).
Export Shock
Our rst simulation concentrated on the enormous demand increase in West Ger-
many after the opening of the wall. The upper left panel of gure 5 shows the
share of West German \exports" towards East Germany Xw-X as share of West
German gross domestic product Yw. This demand push amounted to 9 percent in
1992-1994. What would have happened when this extraordinary demand stem-
ming from East Germany would have been smaller? For this purpose, we assume
that exports to eastern Germany were reduced by 25% from the third quarter of
1990 on. This negative demand shock totals 4.9 billion DM in 1990.3 and reaches
16.7 billion DM in 1994.4. The simulation period is 1990.3 to 1994.4. For the
period after 1994, West German national accounting are not available from the
Federal Statistical Oce. This simulation period includes both a regime domi-
nated by capacity constraints in 1990.3-1992.1 and a demand constrained regime
in 1992.2-1994.2.
The second left panel exhibits the relative dierences of output Y and goods
demand YD. Reported are the relative dierences of shock vs. control simulation.
During the capacity regime before 1992, the eect of the demand shock is much
larger for goods demand than for output itself. However, to the extent that the
demand regime gains importance in the recession 1992, the gap closes. Output
would have been smaller by almost 2 percent, i.e. 10 billion DM per quarter,
by the end of 1993 given a smaller demand increase from East Germany, which
could have resulted, e.g. from a less favourable exchange rate for private monetary
assets.
The main focus of our macroeconometric model is the labour market. There-
fore, the bottom left panel of gure 5 provides gures for the relative dierences in
the employment series. The eect on demand determined employment L(YD) cor-
responds closely to the eect on demand itself, since eects on technology, which
might blur this relation, are relevant only in a longer horizon. Demand determined
employment shrinks by up to 600,000 employees in 1993.1, i.e. by more than 2 per-
cent of the West German labour force. In contrast, capacity employment L(YC)
does not show any eect in the beginning and decreases only marginally from
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Figure 5: Simulated eects of export and scal policy shocks
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1993.1 onwards. Two reasons can be put forward to explain this very sluggish
reaction: First, the time span from the investment decision to its realization lasts
about six quarters and the adjustment to the optimal capital stock is quite slow
(see the estimates in table 1). Second, during the rst quarters of our simula-
tion period, the economy was still in a capacity regime, i.e. the reduced demand
gains importance for investment decisions only from about 1992.1 onwards, when
the economy turned to a demand regime. Total eects on employment L become
relevant only from about 1992.1 onwards, when demand determined employment
falls short of capacity employment. To sum up, the eect of our simulated export
shock is more distinctive in a demand regime than in a capacity regime.
Fiscal Policy Shock
We carried out a second simulation for unied Germany in order to get an impres-
sion about the inuence of the enormous public support on private investment.
Therefore, we assume that the nancial incentives were halved, i.e. a reduction
of the variable sub by 50%. This reduction saves at least half of the expenditures
for governmental investment subsidies in East Germany.
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We assume that this
money is spend for governmental consumption. The simulation period is chosen
from 1993.2-1997.3. This implies a concentration on the capacity regime, which
is dominant from 1994.2 onwards. Reported are again the relative dierences of
shock vs. control simulation.
The cut back of nancial support causes a decrease of the capital stock by
about 1.25 percent until 1997.3. This development corresponds to a loss of an
accumulated gross investment volume of 86 billion DM over the whole simula-
tion period. The slowdown of investment translates into smaller capacities YC.
The upper right panel shows the simulated change of capacities YC. Although
the slowdown of investment builds up to a relevant extent over the years, the
short{run impact on aggregate demand is small and overcompensated by the ad-
ditional governmental spending. Therefore, the simulated change in demand YD
in the middle right panel is positive over almost the complete simulation period.
Nevertheless, since capacities were the main limiting factor from 1994.2 onwards,
the simulated reductions of investment lead to a further strengthening of this
constraint and, consequently, to a decrease in output Y by 0.5 percent in 1997.
This result highlights again the dierence of our model with endogenous regime
determination from a standard Keynesian multiplier model.
Employment L (lower right panel) is also reduced by about 0.5 percent in
1997. The eect on capacity employment L(YC) is even larger and only partially
compensated by the increase of demand determined employment L(YD).
18
In fact, due to the resulting decrease in investment, the savings are even larger. Thus, our
simulation provides a conservative estimate of the demand side eects.
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6 Conclusions
The transformation process in the middle and east European economies consti-
tutes a tremendous task for policy makers and economic advisers. The case of East
Germany is a special case for several reasons. The political system was adopted
from West Germany. The change of the economic system came in one step, in
less than one year, but was cushioned by huge transfers, which are possible due to
the relative size and wealth of East and West Germany. Nevertheless, production
broke down by 40 percent and about two third of jobs were lost in East Germany.
At the same time, West Germany experienced a unication boom with increases of
demand, output and employment. The adjustment of the East German economy
towards West Germany is slow. Today, total factor productivity reached about
50 percent, starting from 40 percent in 1990, while wages are at about 60 percent
of the West German level. This implies higher unit labour costs for the East.
In this paper, the macroeconomic adjustment to the shock of German unica-
tion is analyzed. The analysis is based on a theoretical framework with imperfectly
competitive product markets and a special emphasis on investment and employ-
ment adjustment. Clearly, the unication shock was much larger than shocks
usually analyzed in the context of macroeconometric models. Therefore, it is a
valuable nding that our macroeconometric model can cope with the resulting
regime changes to a large extent, because these regime changes are modeled en-
dogenously. Estimates are based on West German data for the period 1960-1994
and on data for unied Germany from 1991-1997 using a SUR{approach to exploit
as much information as possible. It is found that most econometric specications
can be successfully carried over from the West German specication to a model
for unied Germany using this approach. The results also reveal dierences in the
adjustment processes, in particular for investment and employment adjustment.
The dierences in investment behaviour can be partially explained by the strong
inuence of public subsidies on East German private investment.
Policy simulations within the macroeconometric model highlight the relevance
of the shocks related to unication and the importance of the economic regime in
West Germany when the shocks occurred. The two simulations cover the demand
increase in West from East Germany and the West German unication boom
on the one hand, and the impact of nancial incentives for investment in East
Germany on the other hand.
Our future research will include further simulations of the eects of unication,
especially the impact of policy measures, e.g. eects on prices and wages, user
costs of capital taking into account the scal incentives, and the international
spill-over of the unication shock. Furthermore, the model will be completed by
integrating capital markets, the public sector and a more rened treatment of the
trade relations to the major trading partners of Germany. Finally, the availability
25
of more data for East Germany and unied Germany may allow for the explicit
modeling of the East German economy. In particular, productivity adjustment
through capital deepening and technology transfers, as well as wage and price
adjustments are on our research agenda.
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Appendix
Figure 6: Productivity
1000 DM
1000 DM
1000 DM
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Table 3: Wald Tests
Wald Test: Chi-square
Investment Employment
dynamic 155:93
(0.00)
10:78
(0.15)
long term 84:06
(0.00)
0:91
(0.64)
p{values in parentheses
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